ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have been operating in the financial markets for a long time such as the Kuwait Investment Authority was incorporated in 1953. It attracted the attention of global finance markets only since 2006 when these SWFs made a few investments in the trouble financial institutions 1 . Temasek Holdings ("Temasek") is one of the biggest and most transparent. Study on Temasek can provide a rare opportunity to have a look at the inside of these funds. First, a brief introduction on Temasek is presented including its block investments (defined as an investment Temasek holds at least 20% ownership), the significance of this study on Temasek and a literature review.
Then this paper explores a few questions concerning the block investments made by Temasek. They include: how 1 For example, in November 2007, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority announced a deal to buy a 4.9 percent stake in Citigroup for $7.5 billion. In December 2007,
TEMASEK HOLDINGS

Background
Temasek was incorporated in 1974 as a limited liability exempt private company to hold equity investments previously held directly by the Ministry of Finance, Singapore. Under the Companies Act of Singapore, an exempt private company is defined as a private company which shares are not held directly or indirectly by any corporation and which has not more than 20 shareholders. As an exempt private company, Temasek is not required to publish its financial accounts. In order to raise debt, Temasek reported its accounts to the public for the first time in its 30-year history on October 12 2004. Since then, Temasek has had an overall corporate credit rating of "Aaa" by Moody"s and "AAA" by Standard & Poor"s. Temasek manages a large portfolio, which spans various industries. The portfolio value during FY2004-2008 2 is shown below. The calculations are based on market value of listed assets and book value for unlisted assets less debt. The appointment, re-appointment or removal of the Board members and / or CEO is subject to the approval of the Elected President of the Republic of Singapore. Being different from the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, Temasek does not manage the reserves of the Singapore Government.
It adopts a direct investment and public market investments. The firms investigated in this paper are from either Temasek"s direct investments or assets previously held by the Ministry of Finance, Singapore.
The Block Investments Made By Temasek
The methodology of calculating cash flow rights and control rights from Faccio and Lang (2002) is adopted.
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The Significance of the Study on Temasek
There are a few reasons why the study on Temasek is important.
Firstly, Temasek plays a dominant role in the Singapore Exchange ("SGX"). Temasek is an important Singaporean investment arm. Temasek-controlled firms, which are listed on the Singapore Exchange, account for around 30% of the total market capitalization of SGX. One single company shareholder controlling such a high fraction of one stock market is rarely heard in other developed markets 3 .
The following Thirdly, Temasek is one of the very few SWFs which adopt concentrated equity investment strategy. Most of the investments made by other SWFs are taking the form of portfolio and rarely amount to a control stake holding (Balding, 2008) . The China Investment Corporation (CIC) is the other one who claims that it also adopts concentrated equity investment strategy 7 . However, CIC rarely have a controlling stake in its investments except the four Chinese banks which shares were previously held by the Ministry of Finance of China before 2007.
Literature Review
There are three streams of literature review. First, it is about the definition of SWF. According to Balding (2008) A SWF is a pool of capital controlled by a government or government related entity that invests in assets seeking returns above the risk free rate of return. The IMF states that SWFs are special investment funds created or owned by government to hold foreign assets for long term purposes. Blundell-Wignall et al. (2008) state that SWFs are pools of assets owned and managed directly or indirectly by governments to achieve national objectives. Morgan Stanley"s Jen (2007) defines a SWF as a government investment vehicle which is funded by foreign exchange assets, and which manages these assets separately from official reserves. The above several authors define SWFs from a quite narrow angle. They either focus on SWF"s special purpose or SWF"s source of fund.
Second, previous studies on SWFs (Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2008) ; (Veljko et al., 2008) employed event studies concluding that the long-run performance of equity investments by SWFs tended to be poor. The main concern about these studies is the data problem. As SWFs did not publish regular financial statements or disclose the contents of their portfolios, it is not convincing to conclude their investment properties only based on a limited number of observations.
Third, there are very few studies on Temasek. Heaney et al. (2011) examined the investment decisions of Temasek and found that Temasek has a predisposition to invest in firms that are relatively large and have few director block holders. They leave the issues of how Temasek controls its Investments and the effects on corporate performance unanswered. Anga and King (2006) simply concluded that government-linked firms in Singapore outperform private firms.
THE CONTROL MECHANISM OF TEMASEK
Temasek adopts a series of tools to maintain and enhance its control over its investments in listed firms. They are called "control-enhancing tools". Some of these tools or strategies mentioned below are not mutually exclusive.
A, being in absolute control
Temasek is the absolutely controlling shareholder in a large fraction of its block investments in listed companies.
Here "Absolute Control" is defined as Temasek holds at least 50% control rights. The following Table 4 shows the fraction of firms under absolute control of Temasek during FY2004-2008. This pyramiding structure creates the discrepancy between cash flow rights and control rights. 
D, To Increase Ownership in Parent Company
Through this strategy, Temasek at the beginning is not the largest shareholder (directly or indirectly through its controlled entity) but then increases its stake in the parent company of its target firm. Finally, Temasek is in control of the target firm by combining its direct and indirect holdings.
The following Figure 2 shows such an example. Table 6 ). 
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FIRMS CONTROLLED BY TEMASEK
In this section, a series of regressions are undertaken to study the performance of the companies controlled by
Temasek. The sample firms are all included in Table 2 .
Data
Data Sources
No single data base provides all required information of these companies. The majority of the data items were manually collected from a varity of sources. The following Table 7 provides data sources in detail. 
Performance Measures
Empirical studies often examine Tobin"s Q as performance measure. The numerator of Q is the year-end market value of common stock, and the book value of preferred stock and debt. The denominator is year-end book value of its total assets. The methodology was also adopted by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) .
The other variable to measure firm performance is accounting rate of return, of particular is Return on Asset (ROA). It is defined as net earnings after interest expenses and taxes /asset. The issue is that the entire sample firms are controlled by one ultimate shareholder, Temasek. It is possible and quite likely that the top management of Temasek may implement internal transactions among Temasek-linked firms. The pricing of these transactions may not be necessarily market-based. Accordingly, the accounting rates of return may not be what they should be.
Furthermore, since this study is concerned about the performance of the companies controlled by Temasek from the viewpoint of investors, the Q measure will be more appropriate.
Control Variables
Since the number of sample data sets is limited (just less than 200), if too many control variables are added, data sets would be too few for some categories. The results of regression analysis will be less reliable. It is possible then that R-Square will become high. However, this "high" R-Square is possibly artificially since some independent variables" variations explain just small parts of the variance of the dependent.
Most of the regressions are with fixed effects. Nine country dummy variables and four year dummy variables are included in most of the regressions. For some cases which have many independent variables, an alternative dummy variable "Foreign Dummy" is adopted. "Foreign Dummy" equals one if the company is not headquartered in Singapore or its main business area is not in Singapore. Among all the 181 firm-year observations which Tobin"s Q is available and 184 firm-year observations which ROA is available, 71 and 66 are defined as "Foreign". This variable is also used to explore the performance of these foreign firms. In this case, fixed effects are then not feasible since there are no within country variations in this variable. La Porta et al. (2002) and Claessens et al. (2002) adopted random effect models.
Further, leverage can play a disciplinary role by limiting the free cash flow at hand, and hence the managers of indebted firms are less able to invest in projects with negative net present values (Jensen, 1986) . The Debt Ratio, which is defined as the sum of the book value of short-term and long-term debt over the book value of assets, is controlled for leverage. Other factors such as growth opportunity, firm size, firm age and asset structure may also be controlled. However, considering the limited number of sample observations, they are not considered in this paper.
When more data sets from a longer time period are available, more explanatory variables could be studied.
Summary Statistics
The following Table 8 describes the summary statistics of the variables used in the regressions followed. From the above Table 8 , we can see that the Tobin"s Q has an average value of 1.52 and a minimum and maximum of 0.45 and 6.83. The accounting measure ROA has a mean value of 8%. The minimum ROA -152% is from the Global Crossing, which was under bankruptcy protection. To include or exclude this extreme data item does not affect the sign of the coefficients and the significance of the regressions results. The mean debt ratio is 54.3%.
The maximum item value is 111.4% from Global Crossing in the end of 2005. The average cash flow rights owned by Temasek is 36.3% with a minimum and maximum 4.2% and 96.3%. The minimum control rights are 19%. The average dispersion ratio, which is measured as the ratio of control rights over cash flow rights, is 1.55. It suggests that
Temasek as the ultimate owner shares a higher control rights than the corresponding cash flow rights in a large fraction of these companies.
The Performance of the Firms Controlled by Temasek
In this part, a serious of questions will be discussed including: the performance of Temasek"s investments in foreign countries, and the role of disparity between cash flow rights and control rights resulting from the use of control-enhancing tools.
The econometric model applied in the following regressions is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with panel data.
Two questions should be discussed.
Firstly, the basic forms of these models assume that the standard errors have the same variance across all observation points. Since the panel data set has multiple observations of the same firm, the standard errors are possible correlated across firms and/or years. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors should be applied (Peterson, 2009) . In this paper, the Huber-White standard errors are applied. In regressions, both firm and year are cluster variables. In the regressions based on individual year data, only firm is cluster variable.
Secondly, the implication of small sample size should be explored. The total number of observations is limited and the numbers of observations for each of the five individual years 2004-08 are even much less, ranging from 29 to 39. The relations will tend to be less significant even when the degree of association is unchanged. The pooled OLS results are the main consideration of this paper while the results from individual years are also discussed. In addition, all regressions are carefully conducted to avoid that one or a few data items drive the main results.
The Performance of Temasek's Investments in Foreign Countries
In this part, the performance of Temasek"s investments in foreign countries is analysed. The foreign country is defined as a country rather than Singapore. The companies which are headquartered in these foreign countries or main business areas are in these foreign countries are defined as foreign companies. In the sample data of this study, these two criteria are consistent. A dummy variable "Foreign Dummy" is setup to describe this. The following Table   9 shows the pooled regression results and yearly results. If a univariate analysis is performed, the results are also consistent. The following Table 10 shows that Tobin"s Q and ROA are significant between foreign companies and non-foreign companies, and the Debt Ratio is also significantly different. The following Table 11 shows the fraction of block investments in foreign countries/regions in Temasek"s portfolio. The calculation of denominator is based on market value of listed assets and book value of unlisted assets less debt.
If assuming that among the listed block investments (Row 2, Table 11 ), the fractions of investment in foreign regions are the same as the fractions from the total portfolio (Row 1, It is reasonable to conclude that since Temasek"s listed block investments in foreign regions underperform, Temasek has steadily decreases such kind of investments. 
The Effect of the Disparity between Cash Flow Rights and Control Rights
The difference between control rights and cash flow rights are as a proxy for the entrenchment effect. The hypothesis is that the higher the dispersion, defined as the ratio between control rights and cash flow rights, the lower the corporate valuation.
The following Table 12 shows the role of the disparity between control rights and cash flow rights in corporate valuation. In the pooled regression 1, all firm-year observations, which have same and different control rights from cash flow rights, are included in the sample data. The country dummy variables are nine country dummies. Only Country 1, which is defined as being equal 1 if the company is based in Singapore, is reported. In the pooled regression 2, only firm-year observations, which have different control rights from cash flow rights, are included in the sample data. Since there are fewer data sets, the Foreign Dummy rather than nine country dummy variables is included. In the individual year regressions, the country dummy is Foreign Dummy.
The Table 12 shows that whether including or excluding the firm-year observations with same control rights to cash flow rights, the coefficients of Dispersion are both significantly negative (within 1% and 10% confidence level respectively). It demonstrates that one standard deviation increase in the disparity, Tobin"s Q will be lowered 0.32 standard deviation. Considering that even only the mechanism of pyramiding is considered in calculating disparity, 100 of 179 firm-year observations are sharing a disparity between cash flow rights and control rights. If other mechanisms including Golden Shares and so on are also included, the problem will be more serious. The minority shareholders are detrimental to the wide adoption of the control-enhancing tools. The coefficients of Debt Ratio are 22 Rows 1, 2, 4 and 5 are from Temasek 2005 Temasek , 2006 Temasek , 2007 Temasek , 2008 Temasek and 2009 Annual Reviews. Row 4 is assumed to be equal Row1*Row2. Row6 is assumed to be equal Row1*Row4.
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positively significant suggesting a positive role of debt in corporate valuation. Country Dummies also significantly perform as predicted. 
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OR PURE ECONOMIC GOAL?
The objective of Temasek is to maximize the wealth created defined as the total return minus the minimum 
CONCLUSIONS
SWFs have attracted attentions of financial markets and policy-makers for a while. A limited number of studies try to define this new type of investment fund. Some of these studies also show that SWF"s long-run performance
